Dialectic - the theory of explanatory critique
"Dialectical critical realism’s dialectic of freedom ... argues that we can derive the formal criteria for the good society, involving the free flourishing of each as a condition for the free flourishing of all, from either our agency or our discourse alone" Bhaskar Enlightened Common Sense (ECS), p. 134). That is to say, we do not need religious texts, convention, or divine revelation to decide the criteria for a good society.
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One of the important steps that Bhaskar had to take, to achieve a philosophy that could allow emancipation, was to argue that it is possible to move from an "is" (a state of affairs in the world) towards an "ought" (an idea of what one ought to do, based on a value associated with that state of affairs). This was a huge step because most philosophy before Bhaskar argued that it is not possible to move from an "is" to an "ought", that is, it assumed that science cannot tell us anything about values. Instead, it is assumed that one must obtain what one "ought" to do from God, religion or social consensus. As such, according to this non-Bhaskarian position, it is not possible to use science (the study of what "is") to critique religious or consensus values and ethics. It is easy to see why this kind of philosophy was, and still is, popular with those who want to maintain the world's status quo, with its inherent inequalities, in which the wellbeing of a few - protected by religious and long-standing social mores - are maintained at the expense of the wellbeing of the many. Bhaskar's philosophy lays the ground work to challenge this status quo on the basis of what would truly be best for the wellbeing of all (not what people perhaps currently think would be best). Bhaskar called his approach to morality and ethics moral realism because it takes as its starting point the idea that values are things that are present in the world, they have an ontology. For instance, it simply is the case that humans flourish when they have good social relations (we know for instance that babies literally die without human contact) and therefore, if we want people to flourish, it is necessary for us as individuals, and for society as a whole, to treat people in a sociable (kind and inclusive) way. We do not need convention, laws or religion to tell us that we need to treat people kindly; we can gather this ethical principle from studying the way that people are. For more about Bhaskar's moral realism compared to other versions of morality and moral realism, click here.
Roy Bhaskar's process of arriving at a theory about the nature of the process of emancipation came about after a long gestation period and a deep, critical engagement with the dialectical theory of Hegel and Marx. A key break-through for him came when he worked out the important role of absence. He was able to show that absence or the negative is necessary for change, whether this is change in in our knowledge or in our social context. Both depend on the removal of real absences (omissions, incompleteness) towards greater completeness, inclusiveness and coherence (ECS, p. 18). Bhaskar explains that the theory of explanatory critique allows for the possibility that social science (or more generally science) may be able to rationally justify social interventions and policies, not least by discovering "true and wellgrounded values". Specifically, it will find these values by "undermining beliefs that prove to be incompatible with their own true explanation". This process can be seen to involve three steps or arguments (ECS, p97-8).
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Step one
The first step is to see that all discourse is implicitly or explicitly critical or at least has a critical component. We can perhaps see this most clearly in the context of education, which consists largely in the process of learning truer, more accurate and rounded or coherent beliefs about a subject matter. To acquire a new belief about a subject matter normally means to reject an old, less adequate belief about it. Acceptance of the truth of the statement that the earth is spherical implies rejection of the belief that it is flat, and the rejection
of that false belief is already an evaluation, and an action.
Step two
Once we have rejected a belief as false, then we are logically committed to rejecting any action informed by that belief. All intentional action is informed by beliefs, together with desires, values, and a variety of other components of one sort or another. And as we come to improve our understanding and knowledge of the world then we need to modify our actions accordingly; or rather (this is to say that) our actions will be modified if informed by the new, more adequate, beliefs. Thus to reject the idea that there are witches is to
reject practices informed by such a belief.
Step three
The third step is to see that, once we form a new belief, we must not only reject action informed by the old false belief, but we must also be committed in principle to an inquiry about the causes of that false belief, especially if that false belief is persistent or widespread and insusceptible to rational criticism."
An example of the sort of thing that might cause a false belief is a Freudian psychological compromise formation (where someone prefers to believe a falsity because the truth is too painful), or the absence of an independent press (resulting in a lack of truthful information). To overcome these constraints to knowing truth, in the first case one may need to deal with the false psychological structures; in the second case one may need to fight for the right to be informed by truthful, independent media sources. This approach can therefore give activists guidance as to what they need to do to achieve a healthier society and environment.
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The inferences obtained from this scheme of explanatory critique only hold ceteris paribus, that is, they only hold if there are no other open system factors that will make the actions needed to avoid the false belief difficult or impossible to carry out. However, this is consistent with what we have explained in the section on transcendental realism, which is that the structures and mechanisms that underly events and empirical entities do not stop existing if, for some reason, they cannot play out as expected. For example, photosynthesis is still a real potential in a leaf - i.e., the leaf still has the power of photosynthesis - even at night when there is no light and photosynthesis therefore ceases. This qualification of the ceteris paribus clause is as much true for the move from structures and mechanisms to their related events and empirical entities, as it is true for the move from fact to value in the practical social world of beliefs, judgement and action. In other words, in terms of the ethics that one arrives at through a process of explanatory critique, a general ethical principle may be true; but there may be certain instances in which, due to the ceteris paribus clause, it does not apply, thus resulting in a non fundamentalist or absolutist ethics. For example, as a general rule, one should not take the life of another human being, but it might be justified to take a human life if this is what the person wants and they are facing as an alternative a life of great suffering; in this case, it may be ethical to give the person the right to choose to let a medical physician take their life. However, this in no way detracts from the truth of the general principle that it is unethical to take a human life; it simply means that this general principle only holds ceteris paribus. Bhaskar gives a fuller description of the explanatory critique in terms of seven levels of rationality. If you are interested in them, they can be found in several of his books, but they are especially well developed in Scientific Realism and Human Emancipation and Dialectic Pulse of Freedom.
It is also useful to note that Bhaskar argued that Marx's version of emancipation, which focused on the plane of social structure, was limited because there are altogether four planes of social activity; and all social being, occurs simultaneously on these four dimensions, which are:
(a) material transactions with nature;
(b) social interactions between people;
(c) social structure; and
(d) the stratification of the embodied personality.
(ECS, p. 53).
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Furthermore, Bhaskar argued that Marx underestimated the role of ideas; and he did not acknowledge that there are certain "spiritual" - or some might prefer to say "inward" - conditions necessary for emancipation (for more about spirituality in Bhaskar's work, click here). In particular, Bhaskar argued that emancipation requires (on the plane of the stratification of the embodied personality) the shedding of the false ego and the clearing of heteronomous elements that are inconsistent with our ground state. Our ground state can be viewed as "... roughly ourselves on a very good day – when we feel on top of the world and spontaneously do the right thing, act generously and kindly to all" (ECS, p. 163). Without this shedding, the embodied personality will be subject to deep personal conflicts, with the ground state ("good" self) pushing one way and the heteronomous elements of self (not so "good" self) pushing another. This will result in it being difficult to act at all and thus it will be difficult to achieve one's life goals. "Hence one could say, paraphrasing the Buddha, that what you should do in your life is seek to become enlightened or self-realised, because this is the only thing that you can ultimately be sure to have the capacity to achieve; and obtaining it is moreover a condition for your maximally efficacious agency in the world" (ECS, p. 164). ​
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